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In his study of narrative, Peter Brooks derives the convention of 
plot from "the problem of temporality: man's time-boundedness, 
his consciousness of existence within the limits of mortality" (xi). 
As its title suggests, perhaps no novel is more unremittingly con- 
cerned with "existence within the limits of mortality" than Malone 
Dies. From his first sentence, Malone, the eponymous first per- 
son narrator, foregrounds the inevitability of death: "I shall soon 
be quite dead at last in spite of all" (179). But in narrating his own 
elapsation ("My time is limited" 197), Malone replaces the con- 
vention of plot (which concerns a temporal sequence of events 
tending toward some terminus or end) with the convention of 
"programme" (269) whose function, unlike that of plot, is not 
causal but diversionary: "While waiting I shall tell myself stories, 
if I can" (180).' This shift from plot to programme has profound 
implications. For human temporality or, in Brooks's phrase, "ex- 
istence within the limits of mortality," is now "freed from all re- 
sponsibility" (231) concerning action and consequence or "cause 
and effect" (240) in life. In the Beckettian universe, as formu- 
lated in Malone Dies, the only valid or relevant concern is " [t]o be 
dead . .. and never have to die any more, from among the living" 
(264). Here existence is construed as the state of "mortal tedium" 
(217) endured while the subject "wait[s], before he die [s], for his 
body to be dead" (198). 
But the great paradox of Beckettian mimesis is that the ob- 
verse of its reduction of life to the waiting for death is the reduc- 1
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tion of death to the continuation of life: "There is naturally an- 
other possibility ... and that is that I am dead already and that all 
continues more or less as when I was not" (219). Like the maxima 
and minima in Beckett's analysis of Bruno ("The maxima and 
minima of particular contraries are one and indifferent" [DBVJ 
6] life and death ultimately coincide: "till you begin to wonder 
if you have not died without knowing and gone to hell or been 
born again into an even worse place than before" (MD 227). Like 
Molloy's different "regions" which "gradually merge into one an- 
other" (Molloy 65), life and death, for Malone, lose their respec- 
tive distinctness: "The truth is, if I did not feel myself dying, I 
could well believe myself dead . . . (183). As Leslie Hill observes, 
"Living and dying, like extremes, converge to erase all that may 
have taken place between their confines. . .." (101). Angela 
Moorjani concurs: "Throughout the novel . . . it is uncertain 
whether Malone awaits death or birth" (120). Hence, "existence 
within the limits of mortality" (Brooks's phrase again) becomes 
existence without the limits of mortality: "And there comes a time 
when nothing more can happen and nobody can come and all is 
ended but the waiting that knows itself in vain" (MD 241; emphasis 
mine). 
The result of this predicament is a detemporalizing of time, 
wherein time continues but without the succession of before and 
after which is its defining property: "And perhaps he has come to 
that last stage of his instant when to live is to wander the last of the 
living in the depths of an instant without bounds, where the light 
never changes and the wrecks look all alike" (MD 233). Here, to 
invoke formulations in How It Is, it is "the same instant always 
everywhere" (HIT 112), an undifferentiated duration where "all 
the various times before during after" (HIT 107) merge in the 
same "vast tracts of time" (HIT 107), bereft of "subdivisions" (HIT 
95). Similarly, the Unnamable, who can "understand nothing about 
duration" (UN 407), observes that "the seconds must all be alike 
and each one is infernal . . ." (UN 395). Malone expands this 
notion of the relentless continuity of time to include the idea of 
time continuing beyond the possibility of change proper to tem- 
porality: "And the ticking of an invisible alarm clock was as the 2




voice of that silence which, like the dark, would one day triumph 
too. And then all would be still and dark and all things at rest for 
ever at last" (203). Here time itself becomes timeless, as if, to 
invoke Vladimir's mot in Waiting for Godot, "Time has stopped" 
(WFG 24). For there can be no more change in it, only a static 
flux. In his reference to "the indestructible chaos of timeless 
things," Molloy posits a kinetic version of the same condition 
(Molloy 39). 
As Malone observes, there are indeed deaths in Beckettian 
fiction: "How many have I killed, hitting them on the head or 
setting fire to them?" (236).2 But their result is not to end tempo- 
ral existence, but simply to change the context of its intermi- 
nable continuity: "Then it will be all over with the Murphys, 
Merciers, Molloys, Morans and Malones, unless it goes on beyond 
the grave" (236; emphasis mine). Yet, as the narrator of Texts For 
Nothing suggests, in the Beckettian universe posthumous exist- 
ence ultimately signifies, not the realm of the afterlife, but the 
death already in life: "dead like the living" (TFN 91). On passing a 
"graveyard," Moran makes a similar observation: "If only that were 
the only perpetuity" (Molloy 174). At bottom, this death already 
in life pertains, not to lack of life, but to either (a) lack of desire 
for life (as in Molloy's "daily longing for the earth to swallow me 
up" 80) or to (b) lack of clarity concerning why life must be en- 
dured, as in Macmann's quandary: "And without knowing ex- 
actly what his sin was he felt full well that living was not a suffi- 
cient atonement for it or that this atonement was in itself a sin, 
calling for more atonement, and so on, as if there could be any- 
thing but life for the living" (239). But due to what Molloy calls 
"the well-known mechanism of association" (48), life under these 
conditions cannot be distinguished from posthumous punish- 
ment, as the Unnamable suggests: "I was given a pensum, at birth 
perhaps, as a punishment for having been born perhaps ..." (310).3 
Existence as Inexistence 
This confusing of life and death ("It's vague, life and death" [225] ) 
is aggravated by the construing of death as birth, as when Malone 
describes himself as "an old foetus" (225), straining toward "birth 3
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into death" (283). But the difficulty of achieving birth into death 
derives from the prior failure to achieve birth into life, as the 
Unnamable indicates: "I alone am immortal, what can you ex- 
pect, I can't get born . . ." (UN 383). Malone concurs: "I shall 
never get born and therefore never get dead ..." (225). Hence, at 
bottom, existence in the Beckettian universe entails a state of 
"inexistence" exempt from both birth and death: "I exist, in the 
pit of my inexistence ..." (TFN 91); "my inexistence in the eyes of 
those who are not in the know, that is to say all mankind" (UN 
344); "orgy of false being life in common brief shames I am not 
dead to inexistence" (HIT 69). Malone construes this condition as 
an indefinitely prolonged sojourn in "the great cunt of exist- 
ence" (283). The Texts narrator provides a less vulgar formula- 
tions: "I'm dead and getting born, without having ended, helpless 
to begin, that's my life" (TFN 119); "I am dead, but I never lived" 
(TFN 130). The Unnamable offers a variation on this theme: 
"Mahood I couldn't die. Worm will I ever get born? It's the same 
problem" (UN 352). 
In the Beckettian mimesis of human experience, the notion 
of "inexistence," just invoked, progressively displaces the notions 
of life and death. Thus Malone Dies unfolds a dual project. The 
first is to bring Malone's life to an end through eventual death: "if 
I succeed in my breathing my last" (235). The second is to de- 
bunk, through the narration of his dying, the "ballsaching poppy- 
cock about life and death" (225), and replace it with the notion of 
that third mode of existence: "inexistence."4 In the course of this 
project, life is deanimated ("they will be almost lifeless, like the 
teller" [180] ), and death is vivified: "weary to death one is almost 
resigned to-I was going to say to the immortality of the soul ..." 
(229). In the novel, it is not so much that Malone dies as that a 
mimetic convention concerning the representation of life is ter- 
minated or, more precisely, terminally minimalized.5 Through 
this reduction of life, Beckettian mimesis is enabled to represent 
a mode of existence unencumbered by antecedent associations 
or presuppositions. Hence, the purpose of Malone's stories is not 
merely, as noted earlier, to provide distraction "while waiting" 
(180) for death: "That's the style, as if I still had time to kill" 4




(248). The deeper purpose of Malone's stories is not to kill time 
but to kill or dispose of the "axioms" (187) regarding purpose 
and appropriate procedure entrained in conventional notions of 
life and how to live it.' 
Malone deploys a variety of devices by which to evacuate the 
notion of life and thus to render accessible the "stratum" (226) of 
inexistence. In narrating his own decline toward death, Malone 
emphasizes the lifelessness of the period preceding it ("I have 
lived in a kind of coma" [183] ), and then applies that same condi- 
tion to everyone: "Coma is for the living" (194). He also under- 
mines the notion of life by obscuring the transition from living 
to dying: "As to the events that led up to my fainting and to which 
I can hardly have been oblivious at the time, they have left no 
discernible trace, on my mind" (183). Malone further obliterates 
the significance of individual life by indicating that the only dis- 
tinguishing factor in any life is the time required to end it: "Here 
lies Malone at last, with the dates to give a faint idea of the time he 
took to be excused and then to distinguish him from his name- 
sakes, numerous in the island and beyond the grave" (271). 
In Malone's stories of the Saposcats, the Lamberts, and 
Macmann, the same depletion of life occurs. The adult Lamberts 
are "grown men and women embedded deep in life" (199; empha- 
sis mine)! But that life in which they are ensconced is founded 
on futility: "At the same time angry unanswerable questions, such 
as, What's the use? fell from her lips" (202). Similarly, the con- 
ventions of life pursued by the Saposcats succumb readily to a 
reductio ad absurdum: "The life of the Saposcats was full of axi- 
oms, of which one at least established the criminal absurdity of a 
garden without roses and with its paths and lawns uncared for" 
(187). The result is another foregrounding of futility: "It was as 
though the Saposcats drew the strength to live from the prospect 
of their impotence" (188). The intervals of movement punctuat- 
ing Macmann's habitual torpor complete the reduction of life to 
rudimentary movement with merely functional value: "Because 
in order not to die you must come and go, come and go, unless 
you happen to have someone who brings you food wherever you 
happen to be, like myself" (232). The same notion is later ex- 5
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pressed in anal terms: "only rose again when the élan vital or 
struggle for life began to prod him in the arse again" (243). In 
How It Is, the spasmodic and exhausting movement of Born and 
Pim across the vast tracts of mud, "right leg right arm push pull," 
is provoked by the identical stimulus: "stab him simply in the 
arse" (HII 27, 71). 
Transcendentals and the Mimesis of Inexistence 
As the "axioms" (MD 187) and conventions regarding the signifi- 
cance of life are debunked or decomposed, the mimesis of inex- 
istence emerges. But as this state of inexistence is riddled with 
paradoxes, an intellectual device is required to facilitate our 
analysis of it. The device in question concerns what metaphysics 
calls "transcendentals." As Calvin Schrag indicates (with refer- 
ence to Heidegger), these are defined as a priori and necessary 
conditions of human experience: "The primary structures or 
universal determinants of existence" (286). As "ontological struc- 
tures of existence," transcendentals "are present in the concrete 
existent, providing its very condition for being . .." (Schrag 287, 
289). As Ernst Cassirer indicates (with reference to Kant), 
transcendentals are not of "empirical origin" (KLT 151). That is, 
they are not derived from experience; instead, as Wilhelm 
Windelband explains, "lying at the basis of all empirical percep- 
tions," they determine how we experience what we experience, 
and thus constrain the boundaries and possibilities of subjectiv- 
ity (2: 539). Since, according to Schrag, the transcendentals, by 
definition, concern "universal structures of human being as they 
show themselves in the actualization of existence" (284), each 
existent is thus, to invoke Paul Tillich, "the door to the deeper 
levels of reality" which determine the essential form of human 
"existence itself" (1.62). 
There are, of course, many indications in Malone Dies of the 
universality of the experience depicted: "for he was no more than 
human, than the son and grandson and greatgrandson of humans" 
(240-41); "you begin to fancy yourself the last of human kind" 
(253); "it's only human" (268). But that experience is founded on 
and discloses distinctly Beckettian transcendentals or "essentially 6




necessary structures of experience" (Blackham 87) which rede- 
fine the meaning of human being. The transcendental emphasis 
in Malone Dies-and indeed in the entire trilogy-appears in the 
frequent references to the irrelevance and interchangeability of 
particular experience. That is, all particular experiences merge 
into and express the same unchanging and fundamental condi- 
tion whose representation is the ultimate task of Beckettian mi- 
mesis: "The noises of nature, of mankind and even my own, were 
all jumbled together in one and the same unbridled gibberish" 
(207). Molloy affirms the same idea: "And wheresoever you wan- 
der, within its distant limits, things will always be the same, pre- 
cisely" (Molloy 66). Through the representation of particular ex- 
periences, the Beckettian narrator intends to disclose the primary 
structures or "laws of the mind" (Molloy 13) ordering-or disor- 
dering-all experience. In other words, the mimetic aim here in 
representing distinct experiences is, to interpolate James Edie's 
words from a different context, to "search for the ultimate, con- 
stitutive foundations of experience" (241) in Beckettian terms. 
Many critics, of course, have noted the similarity between 
Beckettian fiction and Husserl's phenomenology, which is founded 
on the principle of transcendental reduction by which empirical 
or sensory experience is reduced to its eidetic or formally struc- 
turing components: "Everything . . . is essentially prefigured" 
(Husserl, Ideas sect. 135).8 But our own concern here is not to 
offer another phenomenological analysis of Beckett, but to use 
the concept of transcendentals as a lens by which (if we may trans- 
pose Remy Kwant's phrase from a different context) "to disengage 
the essential core from the accidental" (381) in the Beckettian 
mimesis of experience. In this regard, one is reminded of Malone's 
attempt to describe "the Stick, shorn of all its accidents" (254). 
Perhaps the quintessential statement in Malone Dies concern- 
ing the transcendental project to disengage the essential core from 
the accidental appears in Malone's dictum: "The forms are many 
in which the unchanging seeks relief from its formlessness" (197). 
In an alternate formulation of the same project, Malone empha- 
sizes the relation between (a) the variant experiences narrated in 
his stories and (b) the unchanging condition of their narrator: 7
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"Shall I be incapable, to the end, of lying on any other subject? I 
feel the old dark gathering, the solitude preparing, by which I 
know myself ..." (189). The transcendental project to disengage 
the essential core from the accidental is further suggested by 
Malone's ultimate enclosure of the external world inside a head 
that is not his own: "You may say it is all in my head .. . and that 
these eight, no, six, these six planes that enclose me are of solid 
bone. But thence to conclude the head is mine, no, never" (221). 
That is, the basic concern of Beckettian mimesis, at the level now 
under consideration, is to represent, neither particular objects 
nor the particular subjects perceiving them, but instead the im- 
personal and primordial function by which their very conception 
is constituted. 
So far this sounds remarkably close to Paul Ricoeur's formu- 
lation of "transcendental" as that which pertains to "any attempt 
at relating the conditions of the appearance of things to the struc- 
ture of human subjectivity" (76). It also recalls Husserl's charac- 
terization of the transcendental standpoint as that which addresses 
"how objective unities of every region and category 'are con- 
sciously constituted' " (Ideas sect. 86) by noetic or psychical pro- 
cesses whose operation is governed by universal principles. But, 
as we shall now see, far from mimicking the method of transcen- 
dental phenomenology to uncover the functions by which struc- 
ture is constituted or filled in, Beckettian mimesis, as exempli- 
fied in Malone Dies, seeks instead to represent the "peculiar logic" 
(276) by which structure and order are drained and evacuated. 
The result of these "gurgles of outflow" (287) is a drainage of 
certainty, not a constitution of it. Whereas, according to Husserl, 
the phenomenological method begins "in absolute poverty, with 
an absolute lack of knowledge," and then proceeds "to genuine 
knowing" (CM 2), Beckettian mimesis represents unremitting 
"incomprehension" (UN 325), as evident, for example, in 
Malone's "inability to grasp what order is meant": "For I have 
never seen any sign of any, inside me or outside me (210). 
Further-and very brief-reference to phenomenology will 
enable us to clarify the implications of inexistence in Malone 
Dies and elsewhere in Beckettian fiction, but in a way that contra- 8




dicts the very principles by which phenomenology defines that 
mode of being. Husserl developed phenomenology as the science 
or logical study of the intrinsic and a priori structures of con- 
sciousness. The first principle in this regard is that consciousness 
intends or is directed toward an object-something to be con- 
scious of. As Joseph Kockelmans explains, "all consciousness is 
consciousness-of-something ..." (32). Husserl elaborates: "Con- 
scious processes are also called intentional; but then the word 
intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal funda- 
mental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of some- 
thing; as a cogito to bear within itself its cogitatum" (emphasis in 
original; CM 33). For example, to invoke Franz Brentano, "in 
judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love something is 
loved, in hate something hated, in desire something desired, etc." 
(50). Now, the mental being which an object has in the mind or 
consciousness thinking or intending it is called inexistence, a term 
which Husserl derived from Scholastic philosophy.' Thus, accord- 
ing to the phenomenological paradigm, consciousness exists only 
if objects inexist in it. 
Beckettian narration develops a spectacular reductio ad ab- 
surdum of this phenomenological paradigm where, according to 
Quentin Lauer, " [t] o be is to be given to consciousness" or "to be 
present in consciousness" (151). For in the Beckettian dispensa- 
tion, the supreme object inexisting in consciousness concerns 
the lack of objects: that is, the "void" (234) "absence" (222), or 
"nothing" (192). But if, as Malone claims, "Nothing is more real 
than nothing" (192) and the pre-eminent object of conscious- 
ness is therefore nothing, then consciousness itself cannot be dis- 
tinguished from a "vacuum" (222): "in my head I suppose all was 
streaming and emptying away as though through a sluice, to my 
great joy, until finally nothing remained, either of Malone or of 
the other" (224). That is, consciousness is no more than the site 
where nothingness inexists. But without relation to objects 
through intentionality or directedness toward them, conscious- 
ness itself loses its defining function. For in phenomenological 
terms, as Edie notes, in virtue of "the strict correlativity of subject 
and object in experience," consciousness is defined through its 9
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relation to the objects toward which it is directed: "the subject is 
constituted as subject only through its active involvement with 
the world" (245). A consciousness in which nothing inexists can- 
not itself exist as consciousness. For it constitutes an "inverting 
[ of] the natural order" (UN 388). 
Malone, of course, dismisses the assumption regarding "the 
strict correlativity of subject and object in experience" (Edie): 
"the subject falls from the verb, and the object lands somewhere 
in the void . ." (234); "I have to look long and fixedly and give 
things time to travel the long road that lies between me and them" 
(237). This dissociation of the terms (subject and object) on whose 
relation the phenomenological notion of consciousness depends 
is the indispensible first step by which Beckettian mimesis even- 
tually represents a consciousness in which nothing inexists. The 
project to covert conscious existence into the inexistence of noth- 
ing underpins the unrelenting self-consciousness displayed by 
Malone: "All my senses are trained full on me, me" (186). Here, 
Malone becomes the object of his own attention, and hence 
inexists in it. Consistent with phenomenological practice, Malone 
plans to define himself, through his long delayed "reckoning" 
(181), as a consciousness of-that is, in terms of his relation to 
the complete "inventory" (251) of objects in his possession: "For 
only those things are mine the whereabouts of which I know well 
enough to be able to lay hold of them, if necessary, that is the 
definition I have adopted, to define my possessions" (249). But in 
the course of his narrative, Malone loses many of the objects in 
his possession and the stick with which he brings himself in rela- 
tion to them: "I would hook the desired object and bring it over to 
the bed . ." (250). In becoming the object of his own attention 
and thus inexisting in that attention, Malone progressively evacu- 
ates himself of all content. Hence, his inexistence in his own 
attention becomes the inexistence of nothing: "never anything 
there any more" (288). 
Brief investigation of Malone's exercise-book will clarify the 
implications of this predicament.1° At first, the book records the 
object of consciousness (that which inexists in Malone's mind). 
But then Malone's thinking undergoes a regress such that the 10




object of thought becomes the fact that he has recorded his thought: 
"I have just written, I fear I must have fallen, etc." (208). The 
writing records the object of consciousness, but then itself be- 
comes a secondary object of consciousness, while the original 
object of consciousness becomes irretrievable: "That is not what I 
said, I could swear to it, that is what I wrote" (209). This situation 
anticipates that in The Unnamable where consciousness exists as 
the awareness of a voice or articulating consciousness which it 
repudiates ("It's not I" [UN 4101) but with which it is exclusively 
concerned: "Ah if only this voice could stop, this meaningless 
voice which prevents you from being nothing ..." (UN 370). That 
is, consciousness exists through the inexistence in it of a prior 
consciousness which is not its own but through awareness of which 
it sustains a minimal being. In alternate formulation, the exist- 
ence of a primary consciousness becomes inexistence in a sec- 
ondary consciousness which is conscious only of "incomprehen- 
sion" (UN 325) concerning it. 
Provenance of the Mimesis of Inexistence 
It is, of course, impossible to derive the Beckettian mimesis of 
inexistence from any single factor or precursor. But in so far as 
Beckettian inexistence concerns the absolute isolation of the ob- 
ject of consciousness from the subject in which it inheres or 
inexists, one source involves Beckett's own early emphasis, in 
"Bram Van Velde," on the breakdown of the relation between sub- 
ject and object or "representer and representee" (BVV 125). The 
same idea is expressed in a miscellaneous piece republished in 
Disjecta, and applied to "The Waste Land": 
The artist who is aware of this may state the space that intervenes 
between him and the world of objects; he may state it as a no- 
man's land, Hellespont or vacuum, according as he happens to 
be feeling resentful, nostalgic or merely depressed. A picture by 
Mr Jack Yeats, Mr Eliot's 'Waste Land,' are notable statements of 
this kind. (D 70) 
Significantly, Malone Dies does contain a passage which al- 
most certainly alludes to the situation described in "The Fire Ser- 11
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mon" section of "The Waste Land" (1922), concerning the "violet 
hour, when the eyes and back / Turn upward from the desk, when 
the human engine waits / Like a taxi throbbing waiting.... (Eliot 
71). Malone's account emphasizes the sudden spasm of release 
when office workers, "their long day ended" (229), pour into the 
streets where " [f ]or an instant they cluster in a daze, huddled on 
the sidewalk or in the gutter, then set off singly on their appointed 
ways" (229-30). Eliot's comparison, in the typist seduction pas- 
sage, of lustful expectancy to "a taxi throbbing waiting" is ech- 
oed-perhaps even parodied-by Malone: "Some even take a cab 
to get more quickly to the rendez-vous or, when the fun is over, 
home or to the hotel, where their comfortable bed is waiting for 
them" (230). Moreover, the frequent testicular references in the 
trilogy, epitomized by Malone's allusion to "this ballsaching pop- 
pycock about life and death" (225), can also-with some discrete 
stretching-be related to "The Waste Land." For one of the myths 
underpinning that work concerns the Fisher King, Anfortas, whose 
land is blighted because of the wound in one of his testicles. 
But, as we have seen, unlike "The Waste Land," whose mi- 
metic project, according to Beckett, is to "state the space that in- 
tervenes between [the perceiver] and the world of objects," Malone 
Dies withdraws entirely from that world of objects. Ultimately, in 
a manner recalling the phenomenological epoche (abstention or 
refraining from judgment), that outer world of objects is brack- 
eted and left out of consideration, while the focus instead is trained 
on inner experience and imagination: "You may say it is all in my 
head" (221). Hence, the intervening space between subject and 
object no longer matters. For concern with objective space has 
been replaced by concern the subjective experience of time: "What 
tedium" (187); "Mortal tedium" (217); "the waiting that knows 
itself in vain" (241). In alternate formulation, concern with ob- 
jective space is replaced by preoccupation with "all that inner 
space one never sees . . . where thought and feeling dance their 
sabbath . ." (Molloy 10). The Unnamable elaborates: "How all 
becomes clear and simple when one opens an eye on the within, 
having of course previously exposed it to the without, in order to 
benefit by the contrast" (UN 342-43). But inner experience- 12




what the Unnamable here terms "the within"-is itself 
problematized by the condition of Beckettian inexistence whereby 
consciousness is estranged from its own content which then im- 
provises its own existence by obsessively repudiating the con- 
sciousness in which it inexists or inheres. 
Inexistence and Kenosis 
As we have shown, the hallmark of Beckettian mimesis is the 
representation of the "psychological commotion" (UN 323) by 
which consciousness is emptied of the content which inexists in 
it. Moran describes a forerunner of this process: "Yes, I let them 
spring within me and grow in strength, brighten and charm me 
with a thousand fancies, and then I swept them away, with a great 
disgusted sweep of all my being, I swept myself clean of them and 
surveyed with satisfaction the void they had polluted" (Molloy 162). 
The Unnamable refers to another: "if Mahood was telling the truth 
when he represented me as rid at one glorious sweep of parents, 
wife, and heirs" (UN 323). In Malone Dies, the locus classicus for 
this evacuation is a passage we have already cited in a different 
context: "in my head I suppose all was streaming and emptying 
away as though through a sluice, to my great joy, until finally 
nothing remained, either of Malone or of the other" (224). In 
later Beckettian texts, such as The Unnamable, Texts For Nothing, 
and How It Is ("I say it as I here it" [7] ), it becomes evident that, 
once this drainage has occurred, the evacuated content of con- 
sciousness sustains its own rudimentary consciousness of the 
consciousness from which it springs. 
The deeper implications of this remarkable evacuation can 
be explored by reference to the doctrine of the kenosis or evacuatio 
(self-emptying), whereby, according to W.H.C. Frend, Christ "vol- 
untarily divested himself of power in submitting to incarnation 
for the purpose of conquering death and saving man" (210). The 
doctrine, derived from 2 Cor. 8:9, is epitomized by Aquinas (here 
quoting Augustine): "'He emptied Himself, taking the form of a 
servant, that he might become a servant; yet did He not lose the 
fulness of the form of God' " (ST III, 5, 1, ad. 2). Through kenosis, as 
Aloys Grillmeier notes, Christ chose "a mode of existence which 13
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is a concealment of his proper being" (1.21). The purpose of 
Christ's kenosis is to enable the salvation of man through awaken- 
ing faith in the redemptive power of divine love. 
Eventually, the Christological concept of kenosis was trans- 
posed to the human dimension in order to define religious mo- 
rality in higher terms. Here the supreme moral project of the 
individual, in achieving relationship with God, is to evacuate ev- 
erything within that springs from or expresses the " [h]uman na- 
ture" (Molloy 35) which each individual shares in common with 
all members of the species. As Vladimir Lossky explains, "the 
perfection of the person consists in self-abandonment [ kenosis]" 
by which everything within that pertains to the common human 
nature is expunged, with the result that " [t] he person is free from 
its nature, is not determined by it" (144, 122). In this liberated 
state, as Lossky observes, "the person expresses itself most truly 
in that it renounces to exist for itself," in terms of the drives im- 
posed by human nature, and instead exists for God (144). 
Precisely this kind of evacuation of human nature in the in- 
dividual occurs in Molloy, when Moran repudiates his humanity 
("I have been a man long enough, I shall not put up with it any 
more"), and devotes his existence to heeding the inner voice which 
now addresses him: "I was getting to know it better now, to under- 
stand what it wanted" (Molloy 175, 176). By the time the trilogy 
reaches The Unnamable, the kenotic evacuation of human nature 
associated with the audition of the voice includes, as we have seen, 
the evacuation of the object of consciousness from the conscious- 
ness in which it inexists or resides. At this point, we reach an 
undiscovered stratum of signification in Beckettian fiction. In 
some way, in virtue of its kenotic associations, the celebrated dis- 
junction of voice and narrator or consciousness and content has 
redemptive properties, just as did the kenosis of Christ. Indeed, 
Malone Dies, the fiction with which we are principally concerned, 
abounds in allusions to Christ: (a) Macmann's question, "Why 
two Christs?" (263), (b) Moll's sole remaining tooth carved "to 
represent the celebrated sacrifice" (264), (c) the "stations" of Sapo's 
early suffering in life (206), (d) the "crucifix" affixed to the chim- 
ney-piece in the Lamberts' home, and (e) Macmann's cruciform 14




posture in the rainstorm: "His hands at the ends of the long-out- 
stretched arms clutched the grass, each hand a tuft, with as much 
energy as if he had been spread-eagled against the face of a cliff" 
(239). 
There is no intention here of linking the notion of kenosis 
with a devoutly Christian interpretation of Malone Dies in par- 
ticular or Beckettian fiction in general." Indeed, Malone repudi- 
ates "the consolations of some religion or other" (248), and the 
Unnamable mocks "belief in God" (UN 343). Moreover, the blas- 
phemous strain in Beckett's art very early achieved notoriety, be- 
ginning with the attempt of the defense attorney, during the 
Gogarty-Sinclair libel trial in 1937, to discredit Samuel Beckett 
(witness for the plaintiff) by citing, according to James Knowlson, 
a passage from More Pricks Than Kicks (published in 1934) as a 
"blasphemous caricature of Jesus Christ" (DTF 279). A far more 
vulgarly blasphemous example occurs in the defecation scene in 
"First Love," where Beckett boldly oversteps the decorum displayed 
by the Joycean narrator when describing Leopold Bloom's bowel 
movement in the "Calypso" chapter of Ulysses: 
At such times I never read, any more than at other times, never 
gave way to revery or meditation, just gazed dully at the almanac 
hanging from a nail before my eyes, with its chromo of a bearded 
stripling in the midst of sheep, Jesus no doubt, parted the cheeks 
with both hands and strained, heave! ho!, with the motions of 
one tugging at an oar, and only one thought in my mind, to be 
back in my room and flat on my back again. (FL 15) 
As the above passage suggests, Beckettian fiction offers a scato- 
logical interpretation of kenosis or "evacuation" (UN 349), not a 
Christian one. There's only "shit" (UN 365) in the head: "fucking 
awful business this" (UN 282). The thoughts and feelings which 
inexist in consciousness are to be evacuated (to borrow a phrase 
from Watt) like a "hard stool" (W 251). That is perhaps the psy- 
chological origin of the mimetic kenosis we have examined, wherein 
the Beckettian narrator (whether named or anonymous) is repre- 
sented in terms of inexistence: in terms, that is, of an object of 
consciousness, a swarm of thoughts, dissociated from the con- 
sciousness in which it inexists or resides.12 The primary Beckettian 15
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analogue of this predicament is that of words or voice dissociated 
from the mouth from which they issue: 
`There never was anything, never can be, life and death all noth- 
ing, that kind of thing, only a voice dreaming and droning on all 
around, that is something, the voice that was once in your mouth. 
(FAW 49) 
The kenotic function of this "wordshit" (TFN 118) is to enable 
the Beckettian narrator to empty himself of himself, to be himself 
through the negation of himself ("It's not I" [UN 4061), so that his 
pain will be suffered at one remove: "I'm far from all that wrangle" 
(TFN 75); "I shall not speak of my sufferings. Cowering deep 
down among them I feel nothing" (MD 186). Such is the purpose 
of Beckettian inexistence. An alternate image for the process of 
evacuation is vomiting: "I vomit, someone vomits, someone starts 
vomiting again, that must be how it happens" (UN 409). But this 
interpretation of kenosis in Beckett's fiction contradicts the 
deconstructionist view, well epitomized by Daniel Katz, that 
"Beckett's characters don't 'produce' thought as much as inter- 
pret, translate, and repeat the 'thought' to which they are subject" 
(91). According to that view, "The moment of originary expres- 
sion is always an echo" (Katz 92). 
The Discrepant Aspects of Beckettian Mimesis 
We are ready now to reconcile the discrepant aspects of aware- 
ness represented in Beckettian fiction and, more specifically, in 
Malone Dies. On the one hand, as we have seen, there is the con- 
sciousness of silence or nothing: "Nothing is more real than noth- 
ing" (192); "And then all would be still and dark and all things at 
rest for ever at last" (203). On the other hand, there is the con- 
sciousness of noise or distraction attributed to the object of con- 
sciousness which, through kenosis or evacuation, has been disso- 
ciated from the consciousness in which it properly inexists or 
inheres: "Somewhere in this turmoil thought struggles on, it too 
wide of the mark. It too seeks me, as it always has, where I am not 
to be found" (186). These two poles, consciousness of nothing 
(or silence) and consciousness of distraction (or noise) can be 16




construed as correlative aspects of the same condition. Viewed in 
terms of the evacuating agent, the consciousness of nothing per- 
tains to the emptiness in consciousness which results from the 
kenosis by which consciousness evacuates its own content. Viewed 
in terms of the evacuated product, the consciousness of distrac- 
tion pertains to the subjectivity attributed to the nexus of thought 
which, through kenosis, has been expelled from the consciousness 
whose object it is and of which it remains vestigially aware. 
Beckettian narration tends to oscillate between these two 
poles: the void resulting from evacuation and the perplexed sub- 
jectivity attributed to the evacuated content. But this mimetic 
paradigm is complicated by a third factor-the ceaseless effort of 
the evacuating consciousness to re-establish contact with its 
evacuated content: "a voice like this, who can check it, it tries 
everything, it's blind, it seeks me blindly, in the dark . . ." (UN 
410). Beckettian mimesis represents an almost Manichean 
struggle in consciousness between the need to evacuate and the 
need to accumulate, the need for awareness and the need for 
oblivion-a conflict localized in Malone's celebrated exercise- 
book which records both consciousness and the gaps in conscious- 
ness: "I have spent two unforgettable days of which nothing will 
ever be known . . . (222)." As Malone suggests, it is the struggle 
between "the blessedness of absence" (222) and the need to grasp 
"at last the true nature of absurd tribulations" (224). 
Notes 
1 Hill interprets Malone's notion of "play" as "'a regressive activity 
having for him the same function it has perhaps for children [i.e.] a 
means of exploring the limits between the fictional and the real, self 
and other, order and disorder, identity and difference" (102). 
2 For an early and cogent relating of Malone to previous Beckettian 
narrators, see Hesla 105-06. 
3 For a relating of Malone Dies to "the legacy left by Pilgrim's Progress 
to the tradition of the English novel" with respect to "the inescapable 17
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inheritance of a death that is figured in literary terms as the 'end of 
the line,' " see Thomas 385. 
4 For a poststructuralist interpretation of Malone's mode of being as 
"haecceity" or immanent existence (a term borrowed from Deleuze 
and Guattari), see Uhlmann 120-24. 
5 On the Beckettian tendency to undermine mimetic conventions, see 
Moorjani: "Beckett's novels from Watt onward . . . undermine the 
classic project of the novel to mirror outer and inner reality, the fic- 
tion of transparency" (45). On the tendency, in Malone Dies, to "end 
the tradition of meticulous fictional editing that begins with 
Richardson," see Abbott 126. 
6 For a relating of Malone Dies to a critique of the Western notion of 
"the progress of history," see Uhlmann 125. 
7 Cohn observes that the name Lambert' was rendered as 'les Louis' in 
Malone Meurt, and refers to Balzac's Louis Lambert (94). 
8 For an application of Husserl to Beckett's Company, see Locate lli 
162-66. For an application of the Husserlian device of "bracketting" 
to Beckett's fiction, see Butler 78. Regarding Derrida's critique of 
Husserl, see Trezise 10-13 and Uhlmann 166-69. 
9 See Brentano 50 and Kockelmans 32. 
10 For the relation between Malone's exercise book and the exercise 
book (now in the Humanities Research Center at Austin) in which 
Beckett wrote the last pages of Watt and the first pages of L'Absent 
(the original title of Malone Meurt), see Connor 70. The reference is to 
Malone's comments about beginning his entry near the bottom of a 
page already written on: "The first pages are covered with ciphers and 
other symbols and diagrams, with here and there a brief phrase" 
(Malone Dies 209). For a seminal discussion of Beckett's self-con- 
scious art, see Copeland. 
11 Cf. Hill on the topos of crucifixion in Beckett's fiction: "the sign of 
an unsolved conundrum, as a paradigm for the strange impossibility 
of joining word and flesh together in such a way as to give birth to a 
speaking human subject in whom name and body share a common 
bond of identity" (104). 
12 For discussion of this paradox in terms of the Cartesian cogito and 
cogitatum, see Levy 84-85. For the seminal discussion of the relation 18




of Descartes to Beckett, see the famous chapter, "The Cartesian Cen- 
taur," in Kenner 117-32. 
13 For applications of Manichean dualism to Beckett, see (a) 
Knowlson 445; (b) Moorjani 124; and (c) Uhlmann 117-19. 
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